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DEFINING WILLFULNESS UNDER THE ADEA: Trans
World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985)
The standard of "willfulness" is crucial to claimants under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) because
a finding of "willfulness" entitles a claimant to liquidated
double damages.1 In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston2 the
Supreme Court recently ended a controversy that had been
debated in the district courts over the standard to be used in
determining if an employer had "willfully" violated the
ADEA. In that case the Court held that good faith is a de-
fense to liquidated damages under ADEA This Note will
examine how courts have defined "willful" in the past and dis-
cuss the present standard of determining a willful violation of
the ADEA.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1978 the ADEA was amended to prohibit the
mandatory retirement of employees because of their age.4
Concerned that its company's retirement plan violated the
amendments, TWA implemented a new plan which permitted
1. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1982). Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 to protect
individuals from arbitrary age discrimination in employment. Section 623(a) of the Act
makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individuals age; [or]
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age . ..
2. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
3. Id. at 626.
4. The statute as amended appears at 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2) (1982). For a discussion
of the mandatory age retirement of airline pilots see Comment, Mandatory Retirement
of Airline Pilots: An Analysis of the FAA's Age 60 Retirement Rule, 33 HASTINGS L. J.
241 (1981). See generally Comment, Mandatory Retirement: Discrimination Against
the Aged Minority, 23 S.D. L. REV. 358 (1978) (criticizing mandatory retirement as a
subtle form of age discrimination).
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any employee with "in flight status' 5 at age 60 to continue
working in that capacity.6 The plan, however, did not give a
sixty year old captain the right to automatically begin training
for an "in flight status" position. Instead, TWA's plan al-
lowed the captain to remain with the airline only if "flight
status" could be obtained by a transfer through the bidding
procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement7
between TWA and Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA).8
Plaintiffs, former captains for TWA, were retired by TWA
when they reached the age of sixty. Each was denied an op-
portunity to obtain in flight status and displace a less senior
flight engineer through the bidding procedures. 9 Plaintiffs
ified an action against TWA and ALPA in district court, 10
claiming that TWA's bidding procedure violated section
623(a)(1) of the ADEA. 1" The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York entered summary judg-
ment in favor of TWA and ALPA,12 holding that the plaintiffs
had failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
under the test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.'3 The district court also determined that TWA's
5. Personnel with "in flight status" include the cockpit crew. TWA has three cock-
pit positions on most of its flights. "The 'captain' is the pilot and controls the air-
craft. . . . The 'first officer' is the copilot and assists the captain. . . . The 'flight
engineer' monitors a side-facing instrument panel." Thurston, 105 S. Ct. at 618.
6. Id. at 618.
7. Under the collective bargaining agreement, a captain displaced for any reason
besides age would not have to resort to the bidding procedures. For example, a medi-
cally disabled captain's ability to displace a less senior flight engineer would not depend
upon the availability of a vacancy. The bidding "procedures require a captain, prior to
his 60th birthday, to submit a 'standing bid' for the position of flight engineer. When a
vacancy occurs, it is assigned to the most senior captain with a standing bid. If no
vacancy occurs prior to his 60th birthday, or if he lacks sufficient seniority to bid suc-
cessfully for those vacancies that do occur, the captain is retired." Id. at 619.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 619-20.
10. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Trans World Air Lines, 547 F. Supp. 1221
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
11. See supra note 1 for text of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
12. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 547 F. Supp. at 1232.
13. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas test if the plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts and the employer must articulate a legitimate
reason for its employment decision. The plaintiff then has the opportunity to show the
employer's reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 802-04. For a discussion of
the McDonnell Douglas guidelines see Liddle, Disparate Treatment Claims Under
ADEA: The Negative Impact of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J.
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ADEA affirmative defenses, "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion" (BFOQ) 14 and "bona fide seniority system""a justified
TWA's transfer policy.16
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court's decision and held that the McDonnell Douglas test was
inapplicable where the plaintiff showed direct proof of age dis-
crimination. 17 The court found that TWA had violated the
ADEA by not permitting sixty year old captains to displace
less senior flight engineers when captains disqualified for rea-
sons other than age were so permitted. 8 The court also held
that the affirmative defenses of the ADEA did not justify
TWA's discriminatory transfer policy. Consequently, TWA
was deemed liable for liquidated damages under the ADEA
because its violation of the ADEA was "willfal." 19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's holding that the Mc-
Donnell Douglas test was inapplicable.21 The Thurston Court
further held that TWA's affirmative defenses were meritless by
holding first, that age does not constitute a bona fide occupa-
tional (BFOQ) qualification for the position of flight engineer
and second, that TWA's transfer policy is not part of a bona
fide seniority system.2
549 (1980); Note, Civil Rights - Use of Direct Evidence to Establish a Prima Facie Case
ofAge Discrimination Under the ADEA Obviates Need to Make Independent Showing of
Pretext, 18 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 59 (1982).
14. The ADEA has three defenses to the rule against employer discrimination: 1)
when age is a valid occupational qualification necessary for normal business operation;
2) when the employer is observing the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan; and 3)
when the discharge or discipline of an employee is for good cause. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)
(1982). For discussion of the BFOQ used as a defense see McKenry, Enforcement of
Age Discrimination in Employment Legislation, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 1157 (1981); Com-
ment, A New Interpretation of the BFOQ Exception, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 391 (1982);
Comment, Age Discrimination of Airline Pilots: Effects of the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 48 J. AIR L. & CoM. 383 (1983).
15. The 1978 Amendments revised the bona fide seniority system by prohibiting
forced retirement based on age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982).
16. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 547 F. Supp. at 1231.
17. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Trans World Airlines, 713 F.2d 940, 952 (2d Cir.
1983).
18. Id. at 955.
19. Id. at 956-57.
20. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 465 U.S. 1065 (1985).
21. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 620-21 (1985).
22. Id. at 623.
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Although the Court agreed that there had been a violation
of the ADEA, it did not find that the violation was willful
within the meaning of section 626(b) of the Act. This deter-
mination precluded an award to the plaintiffs of double dam-
ages.23 However, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's
finding that a violation is "willful" if an employer knows con-
duct is prohibited by the ADEA or shows a "reckless disre-
gard" for considering whether or not it is so prohibited.24
II. STANDARDS OF WILLFULNESS
Enforcement of the ADEA is implemented through the
powers, remedies and procedures set forth in the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).2 I The ADEA, unlike the FLSA,26
does not mandate an automatic doubling of damages for any
violation of its provisions. Section 626(b) of the ADEA al-
lows for the doubling of damages only in cases of "willful vio-
lations" of the Act.
While the definition of willful is important in determining
the award of damages, neither the text of the ADEA nor its
legislative history has defined the term. Prior to the Thurston
decision, numerous methods for determining the standard of
willfulness emerged.27 Some courts use a broad definition
stating that the employer need only be aware that the statute
applies to its business practices or conduct.28 Other courts,
23. Id. at 626.
24. Id. at 625-26.
25. The ADEA itself provides for this at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
26. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) makes the award of liquidated damages
mandatory. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 209-219 (1982)).
27. For a discussion of the standards of willfulness under the ADEA see Comment,
The Standard of Willfulness for Liquidated Damages Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 32 EMORY L.J. 583 (1983); Comment, Punitive Damages Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 477-79 (1981).
28. See, e.g., Marshall v. Erin Food Serv., 672 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1982) (FLSA
case); Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1981) (ADEA case);
Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974) (FLSA case); Brennan v. J.M. Fields,
Inc., 488 F.2d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (EPA case);
Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948
(1972) (FLSA case); Majchrzak v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 537 F. Supp. 33, 38 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (FLSA case); Marshall v. Georgia Southwestern College, 489 F. Supp.
1322, 1331 (M.D. Ga. 1980) (EPA case); Pedreya v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies,
465 F. Supp. 936, 949-50 (D. Colo. 1979) (EPA case); Marshall v. Sam Dell's Dodge
Corp., 451 F. Supp. 294, 304-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (FLSA case); Herman v. Roosevelt
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using a narrower definition, have required that the employer
violate the statute deliberately.29
Several courts, relying on the broad statutory definition of
"willful" have held that there is a violation if the employer
simply knew that the ADEA was "in the picture."30 This def-
inition, when applied to the ADEA's liquidated damages pro-
vision, would result in an award of double damages every time
a claimant could prove the employer was merely aware of the
Act.3' In Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp.32 the court concluded
that the ADEA liquidated damages provision derived its con-
cept of "willfulness" from the FLSA statute of limitations.33
Based on that FLSA definition, the court held the defendant
had committed a "willful" violation of the ADEA because he
admitted to being aware of the Act.34
The narrower definition of "willful" used to determine liq-
uidated damages under the ADEA requires that the discrimi-
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 843, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1977), afJ'd, F.2d 1033 (8th
Cir. 1978) (EPA case); Usery v. Godwin Hardware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243, 1267
(W.D. Mich. 1976) (FLSA case); Bailey v. Pilots' Ass'n, 406 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (FLSA case); Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., 407 F. Supp. 1090,
1094 (W.D. Ky. 1975) (FLSA case); Brennan v. S & M Enter., 362 F. Supp. 595, 600
(D.D.C. 1973), afl'd, 505 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FLSA case); Hodgson v. Eunice
Superette, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 639, 644 (W.D. La. 1973) (FLSA case).
29. See, eg., Melanson v. Rantoul, 536 F. Supp. 271 (D.R.I. 1982) (EPA case);
Marshall v. J. C. Penny Co., 464 F. Supp. 1166, 1194 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (EPA case);
Boll v. Federal Reserve Bank, 365 F. Supp. 637, 648-49 (E. D. Mo. 1973), afl'd, 497
F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1974) (FLSA case); Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 392-93
(N.D. Fla. 1970) (FLSA case); Krumbeck v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257,
263-64 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (EPA case); Darod v. Blackstone Cleaners, Inc., 306 F. Supp.
1276, 1281 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (FLSA case).
30. See, e.g., Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). For cases that applied the Coleman test and
found a "willful" violation, see Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974) (company
president testified that he knew of the existence of the FLSA and had heard talk that
recent amendments had extended coverage to his employees); Brennan v. J. M. Fields,
Inc., 488 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (defendant's central
office sent memoranda to district managers advising them of the requirements of the
EPA); Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescripton Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1979)
(defendant had previously violated the Act, had copies of the Act, and was aware that it
paid the female plaintiff less than it paid men); Brennan v. S & M Enter., 362 F. Supp.
595 (D.D.C. 1973), aft'd., 505 F.2d 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prior investigation by the
Secretary of Labor put defendants on notice that the FLSA was in the picture).
31. See Hendrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1981).
32. 641 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981).
33. Id. at 1113.
34. Id. at 1114.
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natory discharge be voluntary, knowing, or intentional. The
Third Circuit, in Wehr v. Burroughs Corp.35 applied this stan-
dard. The court reasoned that neither the legislative history
nor the text of the Act indicates that "willful" is limited to
intentional violations of the ADEA.36 Therefore, the court
concluded that not only intentional conduct, but knowing or
reckless conduct should also be considered "willful". 37
A similar definition for "willful" was stated by the Ninth
Circuit in Kelly v. American Standard, Inc. 38 The Kelly court
held that an employer's conduct can violate the ADEA with-
out being knowing and voluntary. 39 Holding differently
would encourage employers to remain ignorant of the Act.4°
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon decisions
from other jurisdictions where courts had awarded liquidated
damages without requiring proof of the employer's knowledge
of the ADEA.41 The court particularly relied on the Wehr
court's reasoning. The Wehr court upheld an award of liqui-
dated damages against an employer who acted knowingly but
without a specific intent to violate the Act.42 However, unlike
the court in Wehr, the Kelly court did not extend their defini-
tion of "willful" to encompass even reckless violations.43
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a standard similar to
those applied in Wehr and Kelly. In Syvock v. Milwaukee
Boiler Manufacturing Co. ,' the Seventh Circuit agreed with
the Kelly holding that while the employer's state of mind is
not necessary to establish a prima facie liability under the
35. 619 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir. 1980). The Wehr court stated that the term "willful" is
associated with three degrees of culpability: intention, knowing, or reckless. Id. at 282.
36. Id. at 282-83.
37. Id. The court found violations of the ADEA to be "willful" when an employer
discharged an employee because of age and when the discharge was voluntary and not
accidental, mistaken, or inadvertent. Id.
38. 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981).
39. Id. at 980.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 979-80. The cases relied upon by the court were Wehr v. Burroughs
Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980); Buckholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp.
706, 713 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324,
334 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
42. Wehr, 619 F.2d at 282-83.
43. Kelly, 640 F.2d at 980 n.7.
44. 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ADEA, it is required to show a "willful" violation.45 Yet,
Syvock went further than Kelly in assessing a defendant's lia-
bility. The standard articulated in Syvock requires not only
that the defendant's actions were knowing and voluntary, but
also that the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that his or her particular actions violated the Act.46
Another standard of "willfulness" comes out of FLSA's
criminal provisions. Section 216(a) of the FLSA, indicates
that anyone who "willfully" violates the Act is subject to
criminal prosecution.4 7 The ADEA liquidated damages pro-
vision is the counterpart to this FLSA criminal penalty provi-
sion. Thus, it is important to examine how courts have
interpreted "willful" in the FLSA criminal context. When
considering "willfulness" under this FLSA provision, most
courts have not required an evil motive on the part of the em-
ployer.48 One court described an employer's conduct to be
"willful" when an employer "wholly disregards the law...
without making any reasonable effort to determine whether
the plan he is following would constitute a violation of the law
or not."' 49 This definition is very similar to that of courts de-
fining "willful" under the ADEA as knowing or reckless.50 It
is also consistent with the manner in which courts have ap-
plied "willful" in contexts other than the ADEA5
45. Id. at 154-55.
46. Id. at 155-56. The Syvock court is in agreement with Goodman v. Heubleing,
Inc., 645 F.2d 276, 283 (2d Cir. 1981). The Goodman court's interpretation of the
standard adopted in Wehr is that a violation was "willful" when the defendant either
'knew' or showed 'reckless disregard' as to whether its conduct was prohibited by the
ADEA. Goodman, 645 F.2d at 131.
Under the Syvock test a plaintiff must prove "(1) that the employer knew or reason-
ably should have known what the requirements of the ADEA are; and (2) that the
employer knew or should have known that his actions were in violation of the require-
ments of the ADEA. Syvock, 665 F.2d at 156 n.10.
47. The Act provides in part: "Any person who willfully violates any of the provi-
sions of section 215 of this title shall upon convicton thereof be subject to a fine of not
more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both." 29
U.S.C. § 216(a) (1982).
48. See, e.g., Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 480 (10th Cir. 1951);
Hertz Drivurself Stations v. United States, 150 F.2d 923, 928-29 (8th Cir. 1945); Darby
v. United States, 132 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1943).
49. Nabob Oil Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478, 479 (10th Cir. 1951).
50. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
51. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1933). In Murdock, the
defendant was prosecuted under the Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928 which made it a
misdemeanor for a person "willfully" to fail to pay the required tax. Id. at 392. See
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Very few courts have required a finding of an employer's
specific intent to disobey or disregard the law when determin-
ing damages under the ADEA.5 2 However, the district court
in Bishop v. Jelleff Associates,-3 required that an employer
have both knowledge of the ADEA and an intent to evade the
provisions of the Act for a finding of willful conduct. 4
FLSA, on the other hand, may require a showing of bad
faith before double damages will be awarded. As originally
enacted, the FLSA provided for the recovery of liquidated
damages whenever there was a violation of the Act. 5 Since
this resulted in a harsh interpretation of the provision, the
FLSA was amended.16 The amendment gives the court dis-
cretion in awarding liquidated damages if the employer can
demonstrate good faith and reasonable grounds for believing
that his or her actions were not a violation of the FLSA 7
Since the remedial provision of the FLSA are incorporated
into the ADEA, it is arguable that this amendment applies to
the ADEA. Although some courts have held that the amend-
also United States v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 303 U.S. 239, 242-43 (1938). In Illinois Cen-
tral, the Court found that the defendant's failure to unload the cattle car showed a
disregard for the statute and an indifference to its requirement and was a willful viola-
tion of the act. Id. at 243. See also Alabama Power Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 584 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1978) and F.X. Missina Constr. Corp. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 505 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1974), where the courts relied
on Illinois Central for the definition of "willful".
52. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 n.27 (1st Cir. 1979).
53. 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
54. Id. at 593.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
56. The FLSA was amended by Section I I of the PPA which provides:
In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover unpaid
minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving
rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for
believing that his act or omission was not in violation of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, as amended the court may, in its sound discretion, award no
liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount spec-
ified in section 216 of this title.




ment does apply to the ADEA, 5s a majority of the courts have
held it does not.59
The Fifth Circuit has, however, held that this good faith
defense does apply to the ADEA.60 In Hays v. Republic Steel
Corp.,61 the circuit court reasoned that Congress intended the
good faith defense be incorporated into the ADEA so that em-
ployers who acted in good faith would not automatically be
subject to liquidated damages every time there was a "willful"
violation.62
III. ANALYSIS
In Trans World Airlines v. Thurston,63 the Court consid-
ered the various standards of "willfulness" discussed in the
prior section and concluded that the appropriate definition is
as follows: A violation of the Act is "willful" if "the employer
...knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of
whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA." 6  In
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argument that
a violation of the Act is "willful" if the employer simply knew
the ADEA was "in the picture. ' 65 Since employers are re-
quired to post notices of the ADEA, it would be virtually im-
possible for an employer not to be aware of the ADEA and its
provisions. Applying a broad standard like the "in the pic-
58. See, eg. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 913 (1978); Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1310-12 (5th Cir.
1976); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 454 F. Supp. 78, 83 (N.D. 11. 1978); Com-
bes v. Griffin Television, 421 F. Supp. 841, 845 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
59. See, e.g., Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 645 F.2d 127, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1981);
Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1981); Wehr v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1000,
1020 (1st Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352, 354 (D.N.H.
1981); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Cleverly v. Western Electric Co., 69 F.R.D. 348, 352 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
60. Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1095-96 (5th Cir. 1981); Hays v.
Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
62. Id. at 1311.
63. 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985).
64. Id. at 624 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Transworld Airlines, 713 F.2d
940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983)).
65. Id at 625. The Court reasoned that even if the "in picture" standard were




ture" standard would result in an award of double damages in
almost every case.
The same criticism is valid for the standard finding "will-
fulness" in violations that are knowing, intentional, or volun-
tary rather than accidental. 66 A recovery of double damages
would be assured for every violation since an employer who
treats an employee unfairly does so almost always knowingly
and voluntarily. It is unlikely that an employer would acci-
dentally or inadvertently discriminate against an employee be-
cause of age.
Another flaw in the knowing or voluntary standard is that
under it an employer could be guilty of a willful violation
without even intending to violate the Act. The Thurston
Court noted that Congress did not intend such a result. It
certainly did not intend for an employer who had consulted an
attorney and believed to be operating within the boundaries of
the Act to be liable for double damages merely because that
employer acted knowingly and voluntarily rather than
accidentally.
It is also unlikely that Congress intended the criminal
standard of "willfulness" as applied in Bishop and Loeb.67
Such a standard would impose too much of a burden on the
plaintiff by requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the em-
ployer's bad faith. This difficult burden would limit the
number of plaintiffs receiving damages. The ADEA was en-
acted to end age discrimination and therefore should be inter-
preted in a manner which facilitates plaintiffs' claims.
It is likely that Congress intended the burden to be on the
employer to show good faith as a defense to a finding of will-
fulness. Thus, the Thurston Court held that if good faith on
the employer's part could be proven, an award of liquidated
damages need not be awarded. This clearly follows the inten-
tion of Congress.
While Congress did not intend for an automatic award of
liquidated damages every time it was proven an employer
knew of the ADEA, it also did not anticipate allowing an em-
ployer to learn as little as possible about the Act and later use
good faith as a defense. Congress did not intend to encourage
66. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 69:451
WILLFULNESS STANDARDS
employers to ignore the law. For this reason the "reckless dis-
regard" standard is appropriate. Under this definition, as
adopted by the Thurston Court, a violation is "willful" if the
employer knew or showed reckless disregard that its actions
were prohibited by the ADEA.
This definition is an appropriate one for "willfulness." It
gives employers a chance to prove their good faith. Yet, it
does not permit defendants to ignore the law. The Thurston
Court found its definition to be in accord with courts' inter-
pretations of the FLSA provision for liquidated damages.68
The Thurston Court's standard for determining "willful-
ness" best serves the intention of Congress. It is fair to both
employers and employees, and is consistent with the purposes
of the ADEA. The standard will not result in a mandatory
award of double damages in every case nor will it require a
claimant to prove an intentional violation of the Act. It is a
standard that courts will easily be able to apply to "willful"
violations of the ADEA; the result will be the award of equita-
ble and reasonable damages to injured plaintiffs.
ANGELA A. WORTCHE
68. 105 S. Ct. at 624.
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